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ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN CARL SCHMITT’S READING 
Giacomo Maria ARRIGO 
The thought of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) helps to place Islamist terrorism within a certain 
tradition of warfare and political theory. In fact, this form of violence can be clarified by 
Schmitt’s theoretical endowment, as this brief paper attempts to do. The end of the legal 
framework of the jus publicum europaeum and the emergence of non-state actors have put 
into question centuries-old certainties. Schmitt’s theory could help to put order in political 
concepts today ideologically misused. And his opposition to any universalistic tendencies 
questions not only Jihadi ideology but also Western anti-terroristic rhetoric, which is equally 
part of the ongoing global war of annihilation feared by Schmitt during his entire life.  
1. The ashes of the jus publicum europaeum 
Carl Schmitt’s writing Theory of the Partisan. Commentary/Remark on the 
Concept of the Political (1963), which is one of his last work, contains many elements 
that permit us to deeply understand the contemporary world and to frame the figure 
of the terrorist in an innovative way.  
From 9/11 on, Islamist terrorism has become the antagonistic character par 
excellence, a disruptive element in a supposedly peaceful world order. But terrorism 
did not come from nothing, yet it’s very recent in some respects. The geopolitical 
(dis)order as well as the economic and cultural globalization have nurtured a 
dangerous basin of resentment that has resulted in the annihilation of the World 
Trade Centre, perceived as the symbolic exemplification of post-Cold War status 
quo. A new type of warfare appeared on earth and subverted the West, attacking the 
most powerful force, the United States. The initial reaction was disorientation: was it 
just an accident? But when the second airplane crashed into the second tower, 
everyone understood that it was an attack, a very unusual attack but still an offensive 
act of violence. What kind of actor was involved in the plot? The label of “terrorist” 
was forthwith applied on the hijackers and, further, on al-Qaeda’s members. From 
that moment on, every Islamist militants have been called terrorist, regardless of the 
differences between groups, affiliations, battlegrounds and tactics.  
Carl Schmitt’s analysis on the figure of the partisan has much to say about the 
label of “terrorist”, showing up its derivation from the irregular and asymmetric war 
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carried out by irregular troops in a recent past, especially from the Spanish Guerrilla 
War (1808-1814) against Napoleonic France. But before debating on this specific 
point, let’s have a quick overview of Schmitt’s theory.  
Schmitt’s most important work is The Concept of the Political (1927), of which 
Theory of the Partisan is intended as a further integration. In this book, Schmitt has 
identified the essence of the political in the friend-enemy distinction, where the 
«enemy is not the inimicus, the one who has unfriendly attitude on a personal level, 
nor the rivalis, who is the competitor, nor the adversarius, the generic adversary, but 
the hostis, the enemy of the fatherland, the public and political enemy»1, who remains 
the stranger that poses an existential threat to a specific community. «In the extreme 
case conflicts with him are possible»2. This doesn’t mean that war is the aim of 
politics; on the contrary, war is the extreme possibility of regular political dialectic, its 
extrema ratio but not the norm. The potentiality of violent struggles makes the friend-
enemy scenario a reality which affects the life of political unities facing each other. 
Schmitt talks clearly about «the real possibility of physical killing» as the «extreme 
realization of hostility»3.  
Amicus and hostis are the two sides of the political spectrum. All political 
activities fall under this particular distinction. In this specific sense, the organized 
political entity is characterized by the absence of inner political antithesis – meaning 
the one between friend and enemy. Every political entity is «the supreme entity, that 
is, in the decisive case, the authoritative entity»4, in the sense that it decides for itself 
the friend-enemy distinction. Now, the state «represents the classic form of political 
entity for European history»5, from which the perception that the political and the 
state are the same, although they are not; as we will see, the figure of the partisan «is 
the perfect demonstration of the fact that state and politics are not automatically 
synonyms»6. Anyway, the state has had the merit of having safeguarded peace in 
Europe for centuries. In fact, even though Europe has experienced many wars, all 
these conflicts weren’t “total” wars. “Jus publicum europaeum” is the expression used 
                                                     
1 Franco VOLPI, Il nichilismo, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2009, p. 136. 
2 Carl SCHMITT, Sul concetto di politica, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2013, p. 33. 
3 Ivi, p. 43. 
4 Ivi, p. 57. 
5 Ivi, p. 38. 
6 Alain DE BENOIST, Terrorismo e “guerre giuste”, Alfredo Guida Editore, Napoli 2007, p. 57. 
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by Schmitt to refer to modern international European law, a corpus of rules and 
regulations on conflicts between states which has rationalised and limited war thanks 
to appropriate laws and procedures. This juridical architecture, ratified by the peace 
of Westphalia (1648), has formalised the steps to follow in violent struggle and has 
«replaced the justa causa doctrine with the juridical equality of both justi hostes»7. 
The enemy wasn’t considered anymore a criminal to kill or to imprison, rather it 
became a military partner belonging to the same European family. In this way, the 
fundamental friend-enemy polarity was controlled and mitigated, and the war became 
a measured duel. Schmitt’s thesis is that 
as opposed to civil and confessional wars, under the new international law conflicts became 
ordered duels in a circumscribed space (the battlefield), in front of witnesses (the neutral states), 
following shared procedural rules (declaration of war, prohibition of some kind of weapons, 
treatment of diplomats)8.  
Such an interstate system provided the parts involved with the same formal 
equality, preventing the possibility of a war of annihilation. In other words, the jus 
publicum europaeum represents the transition from jus ad bellum to jus in bello. 
But what is a war of annihilation? This definition, a synonym of “total” war, 
suggests an unlimited conflict where the enemy is not an equal partner but rather 
someone to destroy and eradicate. The criminalization of the enemy follows the 
«logic of a war of justa causa in the absence of recognition of a justus hostis»9. This 
unrestricted and total enmity is something fatal, a disastrous premise for reciprocal 
destruction.  
Carl Schmitt states that the jus publicum europaeum started to get weak from the 
Treaty of Versailles (1919), where war has been considered a criminal act for the first 
time in the history of international law. «At Versailles begun the evolution of 
international law in a universalistic and penal way, an innovation that would have led 
in few years to the creation of the League of Nations»10. Schmitt is undoubtedly a 
                                                     
7 Carl SCHMITT, Il Nomos della terra, Adephi, Milano 1991, p. 136. 
8 Stefano PIETROPAOLI, Schmitt, Carocci, Roma 2012, p. 154. 
9 Carl SCHMITT, The Theory of the Partisan, Michigan State University Press, Michigan 2004, p. 
21. 
10 Stefano PIETROPAOLI, Schmitt, p. 159. 
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prescient analyst: the claim of defending humanity under the banner of human rights 
is dangerous since the concept of humanity  
excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being. […] 
The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, 
and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. […] To 
confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain 
incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him an 
outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity11. 
The UN Charter (1945) confirmed Schmitt’s fear: such a legal framework aspires 
to be global. The consequence was that whoever disagreed would be immediately 
criminalized. The jus publicum europaeum was definitively over. 
2. The partisan, the revolutionary, the terrorist 
But also another element has played a key role in the deconstruction of the jus 
publicum europaeum. It was the partisan.  
In Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt has deepened the decisive implication of 
irregular combatants. In fact, guerrilla warfare challenges state’s monopoly on 
violence, as it is non-state or non-sovereign violence against regular state army. 
According to the jus publicum europaeum, war is a privilege of states, hence the 
emergence of non-state actors blows up the balance of power in the European region. 
The partisan is both symptom and cause of the dissolution of the jus publicum 
europaeum. 
According to Schmitt’s analysis, the first historical manifestation of the partisan 
occurred in the Spanish Guerrilla War against France, when irregular forces fought 
irregularly against regular army. This figure «constitutes the overture to a theory of 
the partisan»12, meaning that, from a military classification, it gradually became a 
properly political theory. Then it has been deepened in other European experiences 
such as the Prussian resistance against France. The 1813 Prussian edict on the 
national levies (Landsturm), signed by the King of Prussia himself, obliged every 
citizen to resist the invaders with weapons of whatever kind. «This document – 
                                                     
11 Carl SCHMITT, Sul concetto di politica, p. 68. 
12 Carl SCHMITT, The Theory of the Partisan, p. 5. 
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Schmitt writes – represents, in short, a sort of Magna Carta of partisanship»13. The 
edict was changed only three months later, but for the first time it legitimates the 
partisan as a national defender. «For one moment at least, he attained to historical 
stature and spiritual vocation»14. 
Which are the traits of the partisan? Schmitt lists four elements: irregularity, 
increased mobility, intensity of political commitment, and tellurian character. 
Irregular warfare (1) is characterized by speed and agility (2) on a specific ground that 
is well known to the partisans (3) who is moved by an intense political enthusiasm (4). 
«The intense political character is crucial as it distinguishes the partisan from other 
fighters, from the thief and criminal, or the pirate, for whom violence is carried out 
only for private enrichment»15. The intention of this kind of local partisan is merely 
defensive, as he’s linked to a specific territory and is concerned in freeing his own 
country. «His grounding in the tellurian character seems necessary to me in order to 
make spatially evident the defensive character, i.e. the limitation of enmity, and in 
order to preserve it from the absolutism of an abstract justice»16. Thus, Schmitt has a 
nostalgic attitude toward the partisan, who’s viewed as the one who resists the 
universalistic logic of a supposed universal moral or legal legitimacy. In this sense, the 
partisan is opposed to the tendency to universalise international law that assumes the 
point of view of humanity, which is, as we have already seen, the basic assumption of 
the erosion of the jus publicum europaeum. 
However, the partisan has drastically changed over time. The encounter with a 
revolutionary ideology such as Communism has completely changed the nature and 
the structure of the partisan. The global approach of universalistic ideologies, as well 
as the technical-industrial progress, have made the partisan lose his tellurian 
character. The complete dislocation of the so transformed partisan has converted him 
in a revolutionary combatant. This last figure is pernicious. In addition to the loss of 
tellurian character, William Hooker suggests that «the key distinction [between the 
partisan and the revolutionary] lies in the political potentiality of their relationship 
with the law. In other circumstances, the partisan could subscribe to a system of order 
                                                     
13 Ivi, p. 29. 
14 Ivi, p. 33. 
15 Tarik KOCHI, The Partisan: Carl Schmitt and Terrorism, in “Law Critique”, n. 17, anno 2006, 
p. 278. 
16 Carl SCHMITT, The Theory of the Partisan, p. 13. 
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in which he is, in essence, left alone. The global revolutionary cannot»17. The 
revolutionary has global expansionist ambitions not limited to a particular territory.  
Lenin is the key figure of the revolutionary, its real ideologue. He «has 
internationalised the partisan […] who does not fight a “real” enemy but an “absolute” 
enemy»18. Lenin has brought the partisan in the field of total and unlimited enmity, 
outside the conventional game of wars offers by the jus publicum europaeum. And 
«the war of absolute enmity knows no containment»19. Absolute war, absolute enmity 
and absolute enemy became the coordinates of a new lethal warfare. 
But eventually, Lenin’s theoretical structure has been developed by Stalin: 
Stalin was successful in linking the strong potential for national and local resistance – the 
essentially defensive, telluric power of patriotic self-defense against a foreign conqueror – with 
the aggressive nature of the international communist world-revolution. The connection of 
these two heterogeneous forces dominates partisan struggle around the world today20. 
Other examples of a mixture of local and international elements are found 
in Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, in Fidel Castro at Cuba, in Mao Zedong in China.  
To sum up. On the one hand, there are the revolutionaries who disturb and get out 
of conventional way of waging war, declaring an absolute enmity and claiming 
universal ends; on the other hand, the ecumenical pacifism in the name of humanity 
criminalizes all the subjects which stand against the status quo. In both cases, the 
Manichean mentality dehumanizes the enemy, as Michele Martelli writes in an Italian 
wordplay: «[il nemico è] trasformato da uomo che fa il male in male che si fa 
uomo»21. The total war between these two sides would be a disaster for the whole 
world, as there wouldn’t be any peace treaty between them. Such a world would be – 
and actually is – «a world in which the partners push each other in this way into the 
abyss of total devaluation»22. 
In this context emerges another and more toxic figure, the globalterrorist. 
Although Schmitt has never talked about it, he seems to have forecasted such a new 
                                                     
17 William HOOKER, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, p. 181. 
18 Donatella DI CESARE, Terrore e modernità, Einaudi, Torino 2017, p. 93. 
19 Carl SCHMITT, Theory of the Partisan, p. 36. 
20 Ivi, p. 38. 
21 Michele MARTELLI, Teologia del terrore, Manifestolibri, Roma 2005, p. 36. 
22 Carl SCHMITT, Theory of the Partisan, p. 67. 
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form of revolutionary partisanship. He writes: «But what if the human type that went 
into the partisan adapted to its new technical-industrial environment, learned how to 
make use of the new means, and developed a new, adapted form of the partisan – 
let’s call him the industrial partisan?»23 
Let’s list the features that are common to the revolutionary and the terrorist. 
Irregularity, political intensity, absolute enmity, and blurred civilian/military 
distinction are the elements founded by Ugo Gaudino in both Schmitt’s partisan and 
Islamist militant24. Moreover, as the revolutionary, the Islamist terrorist, who is the 
most important proponent of global terrorism, challenges state sovereignty and calls 
into question statehood, at least proving that there are different conflicts from 
interstate wars. The same definition of “War on Terror” or “Global War on 
Terrorism”, coined by the U.S. President George W. Bush after 9/11, poses a big 
problem to the traditional perception of international law, for here the enemy isn’t a 
state but an unclear non-state actor without a definite territory.  
In this sense, the global terrorist is «a deadly variant of the irregular combatant, 
who performs this irregularity in a more disturbing way»25. 
3. Al-Qaeda and Isis face à Schmitt 
Is that all? Is global terrorism just an enhanced form of the revolutionary combatant? 
Actually, it’s possible to point out another feature that discriminate between the two, 
defining the terrorist in a more original way. 
On this point, Alain de Benoist is clear: the spectacularity of terroristic actions is 
something unique which really makes the difference. The primary target of these 
actions is not the one that appears as such. These actions aim at a secondary effect 
more than at the actual and visible damage they really cause; it’s like a sort of 
extortion.  
Terroristic attacks are only means to influence public opinion and to put pressure on 
governments. In this way, terrorism aims at touching the spirits and at disarming the will of 
                                                     
23 Ivi, p. 56. 
24 Cfr. Ugo GAUDINO, Leggere Schmitt a Raqqa. Teoria del partigiano e terrorismo islamico, in 
“Sistema Informativo a Schede”, n. 5, anno 2016, pp. 17-18. 
25 Franco VOLPI, L’ultima sentinella della terra, in Carl Schmitt, Teoria del partigiano, Adelphi, 
Milano 2012, p. 177. 
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people […] It’s an important difference compared to the partisan or the guerrillero, who looks 
always at the direct effects on their immediate target26. 
 The media unwillingly contributes to spread the terror, as Jean Baudrillard has 
evaluated in his The Spirit of Terrorism27. In these terms, «the fear of danger is more 
important than the danger itself […] and the risk (omnipresent) has replaced the 
danger (recognizable and localised) »28. 
Having defined the peculiarity of the figure of the terrorist, let’s move from the 
theory to the ground. Of course, «Carl Schmitt couldn’t know groups as the fedayin, 
pasdaran or mujahidin»29. However,  
the traditions of Islamic reformism and radicalism that developed in the 19th and 20th centuries 
in response to the frailty of the Islamic world in the face of Anglo-European colonialism, and the 
numerous political and military organisations that have developed from these intellectual 
movements, are not completely divorced from the context and world described by Schmitt’s theory 
of the partisan: from political-military actors such as Mao and Ho Chi Minh30.  
The belonging of radical Islam to the brief history of the partisan outlined in 
Theory of the Partisan is something that allows us to read Islamist terrorism from a 
new perspective. In other terms, violent Islamism is not an eccentric and original 
phenomenon isolated from previous history. Rather, it’s an evolution of something 
already existing, which yet Carl Schmitt has taken in consideration, «showing an 
uncommon foresight and offering interpretative keys by which to consider the figure 
of the terrorist»31. 
Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (Isis or Daesh) are the two main 
terroristic organizations today. They are a big threat to the West and to the whole 
world. Their «binary-code mentality»32 obeys to the Manichean approach of the 
revolutionary combatant: the absolute enmity plays an undeniable dominant role for 
all various revolutionaries such as Leninist-Marxists or Jihadists. These actors don’t 
                                                     
26 Alain DE BENOIST, Terrorismo e “guerre giuste”, p. 78. 
27 Jean BAUDRILLARD, L’esprit du terrorisme, in “Le Monde”, November 3, 2001. 
28 Alain DE BENOIST, Terrorismo e “guerre giuste”, pp. 79-80. 
29 Franco VOLPI, L’ultima sentinella della terra, p. 178. 
30 Tarik KOCHI, The Partisan: Carl Schmitt and Terrorism, p. 294. 
31 Donatella DI CESARE, Terrore e modernità, p. 96. 
32 Alessandro ORSINI, Isis, Rizzoli, Milano 2016, p. 130. 
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take into consideration the existence of a third category next to “Us” and “Them”, 
organising humankind in rigid spaces, as it’s stated in Isis’ propaganda magazine 
Dabiq:  
The world is divided into two camps […] The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr 
(disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the 
camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of 
kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews33. 
Now, the ultimate goal of both Al-Qaeda and Isis is the restoration of the 
caliphate, but they disagree on the method: «For al-Qaeda the rebuilding of the 
caliphate is the last stage of a long-term strategy [… which includes] 
preaching/education activities. […] On the contrary, Al-Baghdadi’s design overturns 
Al-Qaeda’s ranking of priorities […] The restoration of the caliphate is not the peak of 
the process, but it’s its bedrock and its undeniable precondition»34. This distinction is 
important to define two different natures of the Islamist terrorist which correspond to 
the two groups. 
It’s also important to stress the fact that the battle waged by most of Islamists is 
intended as a defensive jihad against the invader, being it a military intruder, an 
economic one, or a cultural entity which opposes the so-perceived “authentic” Islamic 
tradition. Such a defensive nature of the conflict, although being an auto-
interpretation, is important for our discourse, since a defensive battle is, in Schmitt’s 
terminology, a telluric battle.  
Al-Qaeda’s militant is «more similar to the figure of the Kosmopartisan sketched 
by Schmitt»35, as it’s a delocalised network spread on many different countries. In this 
sense, Al-Qaeda’s militant is a revolutionary combatant fully integrated in the 
technical-industrial environment of modernity. This kind of revolutionary terrorist 
doesn’t belong to any particular land. Therefore, the lack of tellurism intimately 
defines al-Qaeda’s identity. However, after USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the 
country became the «epicentre of the Islamist cause»36, simulating a sort of tellurism. 
                                                     
33Dabiq-Isis Magazine, July 2014, 10. 
34 Andrea PLEBANI, Jihadismo globale, Giunti, Firenze 2016, pp. 106-107. 
35 Ugo GAUDINO, Leggere Schmitt a Raqqa. Teoria del partigiano e terrorismo islamico, p. 18. 
36 Silvia CARENZI, L’evoluzione ideologica e operativa del jihadismo globale, in “Sistema di 
Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica”, 09/2017, p. 5.  
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Then, following 9/11, the Afghan conflict has exposed the difficulty of the United 
States in dealing with a deterritorialised network such as al-Qaeda. The death of its 
leader (2011), Osama bin Laden, has had the consequence of intensifying the virtual 
character of the organization, causing an even deeper loss of the tellurian element.  
On the contrary, Isis is a more complex phenomenon. It presents both the 
elements, the telluric one and its opposite, the universalistic aspiration. Long before 
the proclamation of the so-called “caliphate”, William E. Iraq Scheuerman has 
located in Iraq the centre of this hybrid experience: the 2003 invasion of «has helped 
generate what we can legitimately describe as a guerrilla or partisan war which 
depends on significant sympathy from segments of the Iraqi population. The 
insurgency brings together a motley collection of former Baathists, radical Islamists 
and al-Qaeda fighters, now united by their profound hostility to the American 
crusaders»37. Al-Qaeda’s jihadi war against the US has now become a real partisan 
war rooted in a specific land. In other terms, 9/11 was a terroristic, and thus 
revolutionary, attack, but the anti-US Iraqi resistance was a regular partisan and 
telluric war.  
It has been precisely from this arena that Isis has risen. Presenting himself as a full 
actor of the Iraqi insurgency, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, leader of the group that would 
have transformed into Isis just after his death, has hijacked the conflict with the belief 
that it would have been necessary to start from a particular ground for the liberation 
of the Islamic world. The proclamation of the “caliphate” (2014) and the control on 
the ground (the “Syraq” region) have broken out Schmitt’s ideal-typology of the 
partisan: the tellurian character is incontrovertible, yet the universalistic revolutionary 
ideology is present and it’s even more important for the enrolment of foreigners 
(foreign fighters). The two elements – particularism and universalism – are united in 
an inextricable knot. Here “glocal” jihad is a reality, and it gives life to a new type of 
fighter, the glocal terrorist, an even more fatal evolution of Schmitt’s partisan. 
  
                                                     
37 William E. SCHEUERMAN, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, in “Constellations”, n. 1, 
v. 13, anno 2006, p. 114. 
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4. Conclusions 
The itinerary followed in this brief paper has pointed out the validity of Schmitt’s 
theory in dealing with the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. Actually, Schmitt’s 
thought has given the framework in which to classify the terrorist.  
Whether we consider the primarily defensive partisan (Islamic and secular) war of resistance 
against US forces in occupied Iraq, or the global, revolutionary war of Islamic political 
organisations, Schmitt’s theory helps to place both forms of violence within a relatively recent but 
important tradition of warfare and political action38. 
 This means that the terrorist doesn’t fall out of the regular dialectic between the 
two key polarities of the political, friend and enemy. Terrorism is not an absolutely 
unprecedented experience and, above all, it’s a legitimate form of the political, as 
specified by Schmitt.  
We shouldn’t consider the terrorist as a foolish actor or a simple nihilist; rather, it 
is a «rational individual that poses objectives which are often fully comprehensible to 
us, like national liberation or some kind of “revolution”»39. The terrorist is not the 
personification of evil, as often stated by Western politicians. This Manichean 
mentality, which dehumanizes the other, is pernicious since, as clarified in paragraph 
1, it’s the premise for the total, limitless and absolute war against the supposed hostis 
humani generis.  
This doesn’t mean that terroristic actions are not crimes, nonetheless they are political crimes, 
which cannot be recognized as such without taking into consideration the context and the cause 
that allow to classify them as political crimes. In other terms, a political crime is political before 
being criminal, and it’s because of this point that it shouldn’t be assimilated to a regular crime 
(which doesn’t mean that it should be treated with more indulgence)40. 
Yes, terroristic actions have that peculiar character that resembles the extortion. 
But this tactic mirrors the asymmetry of the conflict, revealing the strategic mentality 
at the heart of terrorism. Schmitt seems to suggest that the terrorist, being it global or 
“glocal”, is a destructive evolution of the partisan, but still a figure of the global play 
                                                     
38 Tarik KOCHI, The Partisan: Carl Schmitt and Terrorism, p. 293. 
39 Fabio DEI, Terrore suicida, Donzelli, Roma 2016, p. IX. 
40 Alain DE BENOIST, Terrorismo e “guerre giuste”, p. 74. 
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between friends and enemies, albeit outside any juridical architecture such as the jus 
publicum europaeum. 
However, both sides are devaluating each other like never before: the West talks 
of terrorism as the incarnation of evil; terrorists see the Westerners as infidels to kill. 
This specific war, the so-called “War on Terror”, is a never-ending conflict, and, most 
of all, it’s a global war of annihilation, or, at least, this is the intent of both sides. As 
predicted by Schmitt, from the ashes of the jus publicum europaeum it has risen an 
extreme antagonism which is tremendously severe. The end of the distinction 
between the state of exception (war) and the norm (peace) is the most visible 
consequence of such an extreme situation. Are we living in a time of peace or in a 
state of (permanent) war? The impossibility of giving an answer is the confirmation of 
Schmitt’s foresight. 
